A GSP Double Auction for Smart Exchange

The emerging dynamics of the digital e-markets are creating many opportunities with the vast growth and potential of online services and mobile technology. However, the sustainability of e-markets is uncertain due to industry and operational risks. While industry threats extend to the rapidly shifting powers, fuzzy dynamics, and fierce rivalry, this work examines an overlooked operational risk that relates to the fact present e-markets often constrain e-traders from strategic conduct. Such denial incites adverse reactions that cause e-market failures. In contrast, Smith invisible hand realizes the efficiency of the flexible strategic choice in free markets. Conveying strategies as rules may, also, accelerate the bidding lifecycles due to the automatic preference deduction of rules by the smart exchange. This work presents the RBBL rule based bidding language that enables free expressions of strategic rules in the bid structure, while proposing the GSPM generalized second price truthful matching double auction that computes stable, efficient and tractable outcomes with market profitability. The introduced smart exchange deliberates on the RBBL rules for automatic preference deduction while using the GSPM for winner determination, hence, improves sustainability with the rapid and stable e-trades, social efficiency, and self-prosperity of free choice.