On the degradation of performance for traffic networks with oblivious users

We consider the problem of characterizing user equilibria and optimal solutions for routing in a given network. We extend the known models by considering users oblivious to congestion in the following sense: While in the typical user equilibrium setting the users follow a strategy that minimizes their individual cost by taking into account the (dynamic) congestion due to the current routing pattern, an oblivious user ignores congestion altogether; instead, he or she decides his routing on the basis of cheapest routes on a network without any flow whatsoever. These cheapest routes can be, for example, the shortest paths in the network without any flow. This model tries to capture the fact that a certain percentage of travelers base their route simply on the distances they observe on a map, without thinking (or knowing, or caring) about the delays experienced on this route due to their fellow travelers. In this work we study the effect of such users using as the measure of network performance its price of anarchy, i.e., the ratio of the total latency experienced by the users (oblivious or not) at equilibrium over the social optimum.