Conference
Analysis of a Forwarding Game without Payments
Abstract
We consider a forwarding game on directed graphs where nodes need to send certain amount of flow (packets) to specific destinations, possibly through several relay nodes. All nodes in the network act selfishly and will forward packets only if it is to their benefit. The model assumes that each node receives some utility from sending it flow to the predetermined destinations and from receiving flow. However each node has to decide whether to …
Authors
Karakostas G; Viglas A
Pagination
pp. 691-696
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
DOI
10.1109/pdcat.2012.53
Name of conference
2012 13th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Computing, Applications and Technologies
Conference proceedings
2012 13th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Computing, Applications and Technologies
ISSN
2379-5352