RELAP5 simulation of CANDU Station Blackout accidents with/without water make-up to the steam generators

In the event of a complete Station Blackout (SBO) of a CANDU reactor, the current safety practice is to initiate depressurization early in the transient once a lack of power has been declared. This requires operator actions to manually open the main steam safety valves (MSSVs) on the secondary side initiating a crash-cool procedure. The depressurization of the secondary side allows make-up water to be supplied to the steam generator (SG) secondary-side thereby extending natural-circulation driven heat removal from the fuel in the primary heat transport system. Once depressurized there are several additional water sources available to replenish the secondary-side inventory, and in the event that emergency power cannot be restored emergency mitigating equipment (EME) are available to provide alternative water make-up. The objective of this paper is to examine the processes and phenomena involved during and after crash-cooling and compare these results to cases where operator actions are not credited. Simulations are performed until such time as the secondary-side inventory is stabilized from alternative water sources or until it is depleted.A detailed RELAP5 model of a 900MW CANDU plant has been created including the primary heat transport system (PHTS), the feed and bleed system, the steam generator secondary side, the moderator system, and the shield water cooling system. The 480 fuel channels were grouped into 20 channels by elevation and channel power. The models were benchmarked against the 1993 loss-of-flow event at Darlington NGS and agreed with the station data within the reported measurement uncertainty. Then the models were used to simulate the Station Blackout accidents with loss of class IV, class III, and emergency power supplies. Five different scenarios with/without crash-cool and with different water make-up options are modeled and key sensitivities determined. The results show that the depressurization of the secondary side may create a situation where continuous natural circulation breaks down and intermittent buoyancy induced flows (IBIF) takes place. The RELAP5 predicted IBIF phenomena are discussed, as well as the limitations of the current RELAP5 code. The main focus of this paper is on the early stage of the accidents, i.e. when adequate steam generator secondary side inventory exists and where damage to the main heat transport system can be precluded. The results demonstrate that EME actions to maintain SG inventory are effective and ensure fuel and fuel channel integrity.