Recovering What Is Said With Empty Names

As our data will show, negative existential sentences containing socalled empty names evoke the same strong semantic intuitions in ordinary speakers and philosophers alike. (1) (a) Santa Claus does not exist. (b) Superman does not exist. (c) Clark Kent does not exist. Uttering the sentences in (1) seems to say something truth-evaluable , to say something true , and to say something different for each sentence. A semantic theory ought to explain these semantic intuitions. The intuitions elicited by (1) are in apparent conflict with the Millian view of proper names. According to Millianism, the meaning (or ‘semantic value’) of a proper name is just its referent. But empty names, such as ‘Santa Claus’ and ‘Superman’, appear to lack a referent. If they do, then Millianism entails that they have no meaning.