This chapter presents Russell’s proposed structure for rational belief, here understood in terms of epistemic justification. Russell likens this structure of justification to a bridge, wherein the individual data, or intrinsically credible propositions, make up the piers, and inferred propositions make up the connecting girders which, in virtue of their coherence, stabilize and strengthen the entire structure including the piers themselves. Each individual pier serves as both epistemic premise and conclusion on this model. We show how one might characterize this theory using the familiar “foundationalist” and “coherentist” characterizations of the structure of epistemic justification. On this front, this chapter suggests that Russell anticipates a number of more recent advances in epistemology that blur the foundationalist-coherentist distinction. From this brief discussion of Russell’s view of epistemic structure, we broaden the discussion to Russell’s philosophical method, showing that this epistemic theory is consistent with Russell’s regressive method from earlier philosophical programs. In employing this method, it is again argued that Russell anticipates significant moves made in later-twentieth-century philosophy, not least of which includes the method of reflective equilibrium.