This chapter treats Leibniz’s relational theory of time. Opposing the reading of time as ordering only the phenomena, Arthur shows how temporal relations among simple substances and composites alike are based on relations of precedence among states of monads. These relations are based on Leibniz’s theory of requisites, where an earlier state is a “mediate requisite” for (or efficient cause of) later states, that is, a necessary condition for their existence, that is explanatorily simpler and involves intermediate states. It is shown how this relational foundation underpins Leibniz’s theory of possible worlds, his complex account of contingency, and his highly original treatment of the continuity of time. The latter is traced from its origins in Leibniz’s early dialogue
Pacidius Philalethi
to the connection of his notion of vague states with this mature theory of
petites perceptions
and his Law of Continuity. Also discussed is the nature of Leibniz’s nominalism in relation to the issue of reduction and the ideality and homogeneity of time. The interpretation of Leibniz’s theory of time presented in this chapter is given a complete formal treatment in an appendix, and the reading of his philosophy of relations on which it is based is defended in a second appendix.