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Aristotle's Conception of a Fallacy
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Aristotle's Conception of a Fallacy

Abstract

Woods and Hansen (1997) showed that, contrary to Hintikka (1987), the fallacies in Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations are not strongly relative to refutation-oriented question-and-answer dialogues, but are failures to satisfy Aristotle’s conditions for being a deduction. They are however weakly relative to them, in the sense of being the fallacies that one finds in them. Aristotle finds quite different fallacies in public speeches and in attempts at proof. Aristotle has a generic conception of mistaken reasoning, a conception that includes false assumptions as well as inferential errors (including the error of thinking that something does not follow when it does).

Authors

Hitchcock DL

Book title

Rigour and Reason: Essays in Honour of Hans Vilhelm Hansen

Series

Windsor Studies in Argumentation

Volume

10

Pagination

pp. 11-29

Publisher

University of Windsor

Place of publication

Windsor, Ontario

Publication Date

June 11, 2020

ISBN-10

0920233929

ISBN-13

9780920233924

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