Astell, friendship, and relational autonomy

Abstract Mary Astell's theory of friendship is rich and interesting: it presents the reader with an interpretive puzzle that addresses the nature and roles of virtue and love in friendship, among other things. Recently, Jacqueline Broad and Nancy Kendrick have tackled this puzzle. Broad offers a loosely Aristotelian interpretation, and Kendrick offers an anti‐Aristotelian Christian Platonist interpretation. However, neither fully discharges the apparent tensions within Astell's account, nor do they address what I take to be the most significant result of Astell's theory. I offer a third interpretation that both makes sense of Astell's account and incorporates aspects of both Broad and Kendrick's views. With this account in hand, I turn to the upshot of Astell's theory of friendship, a nascent view of relational autonomy that emerges from friendship. Astell's theory of friendship is fascinating because relational autonomy was not formally theorized until hundreds of years later.