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Journal article

Auditor independence, self-interested behavior and ethics: some experimental evidence

Abstract

Our paper presents the results obtained in a laboratory environment in which subjects revealed their beliefs about an uncertain state of the world and then participated in a simple task which required them to report on whether the report of a second party is consistent with the subjects’ beliefs. Because maintaining prior judgements (audit independence) which were in disagreement with the second party’s decision (a potential for a qualified audit opinion) were costly to the subject, a situation was created in which the subject might compromise her beliefs at a price. The results suggest that amoral, self-interested profit-maximizing behavior does not generally characterize the subjects in this experiment. Furthermore, subjects compromise their beliefs less often, i.e., breach independence, the higher their scores on a Defining Issues Test, but more often, the greater the cost of adhering to their beliefs.

Authors

Falk H; Lynn B; Mestelman S; Shehata M

Journal

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 18, No. 4-5, pp. 395–428

Publisher

Elsevier

Publication Date

January 1, 1999

DOI

10.1016/s0278-4254(99)00012-5

ISSN

0278-4254

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